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The Church and Ethnopolitical Conflict in Kenya: 1982-2013 1
David K. Tarus 2
The chapter examines the role of the church in addressing the problem of ethnopolitical conflict
in Kenya from 1982 to 2013. Though ethnocentrism within the Kenyan Christian community goes
beyond the years cited to the colonial period and the immediate years following independence, the
intensity of the problem after 1982 calls for special attention. The single event that marks political
change in Kenya is the 1982 attempted coup. Although this was not successful, the coup heightened
opposition against Moi’s rule and thus, 1982 marks the beginning of the recent history of Kenya,
a history in which three phases may be identified in the relationship between church and state: a
united church (1982–2002); a divided church (2002–2007); and a recovering church (2008
onwards). The thesis of the chapter is that the church in Kenya generally exhibited a robust sociopolitical engagement in the 1980s and 1990s but lost its prophetic voice from 2002 to 2008 mainly
because of ethnocentrism and the co-option and compromise of the clergy by the government and
the opposition. The chapter, which is based on archival and library materials, broadly examines
the roles the mainstream Protestant, evangelical, and Roman Catholic churches and their
umbrella organizations, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the Evangelical
Fellowship of Kenya (EFK)—now called the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya, (EAK), and the Kenya
Catholic Episcopal Conference (KCEC)—now called Kenya Conference of Catholic Bishops
(KCCB), played in their quest for social cohesion. In doing so, the chapter highlights the failures
of Kenyan churches in addressing the problem of ethnopolitical conflict.
Key words: Ethnopolitical, cohesion, ethnicity, tribalism, conflict, church, Kenya, evangelical.
Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Church in Kenya: A Unified Voice (1982–2002)
The period 1982–2002 saw a generally unified Kenyan church against social injustice including
tribalism. The church spoke in one voice in most cases. Protestant bishops teamed up to push for
justice, democracy, and ethnic cohesion especially during the years preceding the introduction of
a multiparty political system in Kenya. Rev Timothy Njoya of the Presbyterian Church of East
Africa (PCEA), Bishop Zablon Nthamburi of the Methodist Church in Kenya (MCK), and Bishops
John Henry Okullu, Alexander Kipsang Muge, and Archbishops Manasses Kuria, and David Gitari
of the Church Province of Kenya (CPK) were instrumental in pushing for social justice, cohesion,
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and democracy in Kenya. 3 The bishops used the media (television and radio), publications, and
their pulpits to achieve this purpose. Such include, among others, the NCCK newspaper Target
and the various talk shows delivered at the state-owned Voice of Kenya (VOK) later renamed
Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC). A good example of these talk shows is Bishop Gitari’s
six-part series delivered at the VOK after the assassination of JM Kariuki in 1975. 4 Bishop Gitari
summarized this sociopolitical engagement and the risks it involved with the following words:
Bishop Okullu was very vocal. Bishop Muge was very vocal. Timothy Njoya was very
vocal. I spoke out at every occasion. There was great reluctance by the government to enter
into dialogue with church leaders. Live broadcasts of church services were stopped. Only
churches who praised the government were allowed on the air. There was a lot of stiffening
of the part of the government. 5
Bishop Njoya led in preaching fiery sermons against Moi’s one-party regime. In a New Year (1
January 1990) sermon preached at St. Andrews PCEA in Nairobi, Njoya audaciously compared
Kenya’s one-party rule to the monolithic communist regimes in Eastern Europe, which, for him,
would one day collapse as Nicolae Ceausescu’s regime had collapsed in Romania. 6 Thus Njoya
avowed that Kenya had no option but to embrace multipartyism. In addition, he condemned
patronage and tribalism, which had derailed Kenya’s progress. 7
Similarly, Bishop Okullu preached a comparable sermon at St. Stephen’s Cathedral in Kisumu. 8
Okullu offered why he opposed single-party system of government: “I am infinitely suspicious of
one-party system of government being capable of safeguarding and promoting human rights,
because it is there to promote a colonization of the mind and to assist its leaders in staying in power
for life. One party government only encourages idolization of leaders and the party and nonaccountability to the people.” 9
The bishop’s courageous sermons had two major effects. First the sermons rallied the KANU
government against Njoya, Gitari, Kuria, Okullu, and Muge, the five most vocal clergymen. 10
These five clerics had been outspoken since the 1980s resisting the mlolongo (queue-voting)
system of the KANU regime and urging Christians to set a good example of neighborliness. In the
mlolongo system, voters would line up behind their preferred candidate and then the election
presiding officer would do a head count before declaring the winner. In most cases, the candidate
with the shortest line got declared the winner. Bishop Manasses Kuria termed the voting system
“unchristian, undemocratic and embarrassing” while Bishop Muge referred to it as totalitarian. 11
Bishop Okullu said the queue system “produced some of the most blatant and cruel vote rigging

The Weekly Review, “The Outspoken Clergyman,” 5–6; The Weekly Review, “Okullu Ready for 1994,” 3–5; The
Weekly Review, “Njoya at it Again,” 3–6; The Weekly Review, “Okullu’s Volley,” 6–9.
4
Gitari, Troubled, 33–34.
5
Crouch, A Vision, 95–96.
6
The Weekly Review, “Njoya at it Again,” 3.
7
The Weekly Review, “Njoya at it Again,” 6.
8
The Weekly Review, “Clerics kick up storm,” 5–6; Oluoch, Christian Political Theology, 20.
9
Okullu, “Ethical Considerations,” 103.
10
The Weekly Review, “The Question of Opposition,” 8.
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The Weekly Review, “The Queue-Voting Furore,” 19.
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and cheating that has been practiced in Kenya.” 12 NCCK leaders urged KANU “to find an
alternative method” of voting or otherwise they will ask Kenyan Christians to refrain from taking
part in elections. 13
Because of their resistance, the bishops were condemned. Bishop Okullu was branded a “prophet
of doom who should be shunned by every peace-loving Kenyan” 14 while Timothy Njoya was
referred to as a “tribalist bent on causing chaos in Kenya.” 15 Gitari said that he “was in several
instances referred to as a tribalist, a political activist, a champion of political groupings, a member
of Mwakenya (the underground political movement) and a messenger of foreign masters.” 16 These
criticisms did not deter the clerics from critiquing the KANU regime.
Second, the sermons rallied the opposition against the KANU government and bolstered the push
for multiparty democracy. The opposition team, the civil society, and the church united to oppose
the dictatorial trends of the KANU regime and to push for multiparty politics. Even the then US
Ambassador, Smith Hempstone, agreed with the clerics that Kenya must accede to multiparty
democracy. 17 Several politicians including Kenneth Matiba, Paul Muite, Philip Gachoka, Charles
Rubia, and Bishops Henry Okullu and David Gitari held night meetings to strategize how to plan
campaigns for multiparty democracy. 18 These meetings resulted in several rallies and street
protests.
In response, the KANU regime marshaled its forces to stop the protests. For instance, on 7 July
1997 hundreds of demonstrators who had met at Uhuru Park grounds in Nairobi were brutally
assaulted including those who sought refuge at the All Saints Cathedral, a church adjacent to the
park. 19 Several clerics including Timothy Njoya and the provost of the cathedral, Rev. Peter Njoka,
were beaten up. The clergy and the opposition condemned the brutality as a sign of the
government’s infringing on religious freedom, suppression of its citizens, and disregard for the
sanctity of human life. 20 Following the incident, Archbishop Gitari called for a “cleansing” service
of the cathedral. Thousands of people attended the televised meeting. Gitari preached from the
book of Daniel 5, warning President Moi that God’s hand would soon write “Mene, Mene, Tekel,
Parsin” on the wall of State House if he continues to hinder reforms. 21
However, not all Protestant bishops accepted multi-party democracy. Bishop Lawi Imathiu of
MCK and Bishop Muge of CPK issued a joint press statement supporting one-party rule. 22 They
contended that multiparty system would precipitate ethnic conflicts in Kenya. Interestingly, Bishop
Oluoch, Christian Political Theology, 17.
Oluoch, Christian Political Theology, 85–86.
14
The Weekly Review, “A Dissenting Patriot,” 15.
15
The Weekly Review, “A Heated Debate,” 23; The Weekly Review, “Njoya at it Again,” 6.
16
Gitari, Troubled, 240.
17
Hempstone, Rogue Ambassador; Ngotho, “The Day Democracy Visited,” 5.
18
Gitari, Troubled, 256.
19
The Uhuru Park grounds has been a venue for so many other political rallies. The 7 July 1990 meeting, and other
subsequent meetings every 7 of July, referred to as Saba Saba (Seven Seven), borrowing from Tanzania’s revolution
day, which falls on the same day, inspired great struggles for justice in Kenya. For more on the Saba Saba struggles,
see, The Weekly Review, “A Strike for Freedom,” 3–6; The Weekly Review, “Show of Force,” 4–6.
20
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Imathiu had served as a nominated Member of Parliament during Kenyatta’s presidency (1974–
1979) and the MCK had benefited a lot from both Kenyatta and Moi’s governments. This historical
reality might have informed Imathiu’s non-confrontational stance against the Moi regime. 23
However, even though Imathiu and Muge did not support multipartyism, they, especially Muge,
condemned ethnocentrism in Kenya. Bishop Muge, who at the time was the chairman of NCCK’s
Justice, Peace, and Reconciliation Committee, paid a heavy price for his opposition to KANU. 24
On 12 August 1990, Peter Habenga Okondo, the Labor Minister, issued a warning to both Bishop
Okullu and Bishop Muge that they “would see fire and may not come out alive” if they went to
Busia for a church service. 25 Bishop Muge defied him and attended the service at St. Stephen’s
Church in Busia on Sunday 14 August 1990. On his way to Eldoret, Muge was killed through a
road accident. Muge joined the list of other prominent personalities mysteriously killed in Kenya.
According to Margaret Crouch, Muge died “a champion of justice, peace, and human rights,” and
“a true nationalist, a martyr to the truth.” 26 He was not afraid to speak his mind against tribalism
in all areas, including the church and NCCK. At one time he wrote, “The NCCK in Kenya is like
a rotten apple. To the best of my knowledge, the NCCK has nothing to lecture our nation because
all the evils, which eat our nation such as tribalism, favoritism, nepotism, and other-isms, have
found shape in NCCK.” 27
Comparable to the activist-oriented Protestant churches, the Roman Catholic Church also united
in pushing for socio-economic justice, democracy, and social cohesion in Kenya. Under the
leadership of Cardinal Mourice Michael Otunga, Archbishop Rafael Ndingi Mwana a’Nzeki,
Archbishop Zacchaeus Okoth, and Archbishop John Njue, the Roman Catholic Church produced
several pastoral letters highly critical of the government and KANU. 28 For example, in February
1992, the Roman Catholic bishops issued a joint statement saying, in part, “The continuation of
Kanu rule is a hazard to the genuine evolution of democracy in Kenya as evidenced by the brutal
tribal clashes West of Nakuru.” 29 On 22 March 1992, eighteen Roman Catholic bishops issued
another pastoral letter accusing the government of complicity in the violent ethnic clashes
prevalent in parts of western Kenya since October 1991 where more than sixty five people had
died and thousands rendered homeless. 30
Individual bishops issued similar calls. Bishop Ndingi Mwana a’Nzeki condemned the Meteitei
ethnic strife of 1992 saying, “These tragic happenings are orchestrated by irresponsible statements
made in Kapsabet, Kapkatet, Kericho, and Narok.” 31 Bishop Manasses Kuria declared that all
peace loving Kenyans should resist politicians who capitalize on ethnicity for personal gains;
“anything that is likely to cause disharmony, strife and chaos is evil; it is even satanic” and must

Okulu, Quest, 128.
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be stopped. 32 Likewise, Bishop Cornelius Korir of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Eldoret and
Bishop Longinus Atundo of the Bungoma Diocese condemned ethnic-based violence in the Rift
Valley and Western provinces. 33
Thus, during this pro-liberation struggle, the church in Kenya generally worked together across
their denominational divides. The NCCK and the Catholic Church formed the National
Ecumenical Civic Education Program (NECEP) to provide civic education to Kenyan voters and
politicians under the chairmanship of Bishop Henry Okullu. 34 In addition to civic education,
NECEP coordinated two inter-parties symposiums in May and June of 1992 “to discuss national
issues, particularly the spate of ethnic clashes” prevailing throughout the country. 35 NECEP joined
hands with other concerned citizens to form the National Election Monitoring Unit (NEMU), with
the idea of monitoring the 29 December 1992 General Election by ensuring that peace, order, and
democracy prevailed. 36
The courage of the leaders extended to the corridors of power. The Catholic Church and the NCCK,
under the leadership of the chairman of the Kenya Episcopal Conference, Archbishop Zacchaeus
Okoth, and the Very Rev. George Wanjau, respectively, took a strongly worded joint statement to
State House titled, “People Have Lost Confidence in You” addressed to President Moi condemning
the violence of 1992. 37 The statement is hereby quoted in part:
What [brings] us here is nothing less than the life or death of Kenya, the question of the
lives and future of hundreds of families who have been treated inhumanly, butchered,
slaughtered. The scenes are truly heartbreaking. No human being can be left unmoved.
Anyone who carries responsibility before the nation, even more before our God and Father,
must be forced to stop the bloodshed and human misery at once . . . Unless you change
your present policies, Kenya will not be Kanu but a cemetery for thousands of its sons and
daughters . . . Why do you not commit your administration officers, your police, and army
to capturing these men? . . . Why have leading government ministers who made provocative
statements and ordered non-Kalenjins out of Rift Valley province at public meetings in
Kapsabet, Kaptagat, and Narok in September 1991, not been prosecuted or censured in any
way? Your Excellency, you cannot deny what we have seen. . . whether you like it or not
the truth is that the people have lost confidence in you and those close to you. 38
The bishops went ahead to make public the details of the joint statement, and this greatly angered
President Moi terming it a “violation of secrecy and trust.” 39 But for Archbishop Manasses Kuria,
“the statement concerned a grave matter of public national interest” and thus the bishops’ actions
were “a divine right and most patriotic.” 40 For Linus Mwangi of the PCEA, “anything whispered
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in secret would be shouted on the rooftops.” 41 However, not all bishops supported the publicity of
the statement. Others, like Bishop John Njue of the Embu Catholic Diocese, Bishop Longinus
Atundo of the Bungoma Diocese, and Rev. Stephen Njenga of the CPK Kasarani, Nairobi,
condemned the leak as unethical and a breach of trust. 42
What about Evangelical Churches?
Evangelical churches generally stayed away from social issues. They chose not to be part of the
pro-liberation movements spearheaded by Protestant and Catholic churches. They considered
NCCK to be social oriented and preferred to work with the Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya
(EFK), now called Evangelical Alliance of Kenya (EAK) because they considered it to be gospel
oriented. 43 Rev. Jonah Chesengeny and Rev. Isaac Simbiri who at the time served EFK, concluded
that the NCCK was “arrogant and anti-government” 44 while Rev. Arthur Kitonga, of the Redeemed
Gospel Church, believed that the NCCK’s public engagement was an example of a serious loss of
spiritual vision. 45 Scholars point to several factors, which might have informed the evangelical
churches’ lack of involvement in sociopolitical issues.
First, evangelical churches were pro-establishment while NCCK was pro-opposition. 46 Bishop
Arthur Kitonga of the RGC urged Kenyan Christians “to preach obedience to the government and
the established political order” while Bishop Japhet Omucheyi of the Overcoming Faith Church
of Kenya and Father Juma Pesa of the Holy Ghost Coptic Church urged Christians “to desist from
involving themselves in politics.” 47 Bishop Birech of AIC told Margaret Crouch that the AIC
preferred to critique the government “in love” as opposed to “shouting it from the rooftops” as the
NCCK does. 48 Thus these churches did not take an active approach to critique the state as the
NCCK did.
Second, ethnicity shaped the political leanings of evangelical churches. For instance, the AIC,
which has a significant Kalenjin and Kamba presence, supported President Moi, a Kalenjin. A
columnist observed, “The complete antithesis of the likes of Kuria, Okullu, and Nzeki are the
AIC’s Bishop Ezekiel Birech [a Kalenjin] and the Rev. Jones Kaleli [a Kamba], as is evident from
the sermons they deliver at the televised religious services attended by President Moi every
Sunday.” 49 This ethnic factor was not unique to evangelical churches. As the next section shows,
ethnicity shaped political choices of Anglican and Catholic Christians, greatly intensifying during
President Kibaki’s presidency, especially from 2002 to 2008.
Third, biblical and missional reasons shaped the evangelical position on social engagement.
Evangelicals argued that the Church, as Paul teaches in Romans 13, is called to pray and to support
The Weekly Review, “Violation of Secrecy,” 21.
The Weekly Review, “Violation of Secrecy,” 21–22.
43
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the government and not to oppose it. 50 Also, since power comes from God, no one should resist
those in leadership; to oppose the government is to oppose God. Therefore, they argued that civil
disobedience, protests, and other forms of agitation are uncharacteristic of biblically-centered
Christians. On the missional front, evangelical churches perceived their call to be that of saving
souls, which for them, must be clearly distinguished from socio-political engagement. 51 For them,
the primary task of the church is to win souls not to engage in politics. Bishop Okullu observed,
Some churches have left the Council [NCCK] over these issues. . . These church leaders
tend to be more conservative evangelicals who see the Gospel message as for only saving
souls. In some of these churches it is largely a question of the leadership. The AIC, for
example, is one of the largest Protestant churches in Kenya. Many ordinary folks in that
church expressed sorrow that the church pulled out of the Council. They are convicted that
NCCK is doing the right thing, and that conviction extends to the political arena as well as
ecumenical. 52
Fourth, self-interest and the desire for state patronage shaped evangelicals’ political leanings.
Many church leaders argued that the growth of the church and its programs depended on the
support of the government. Thus, resistance and agitation against the government hinders outreach
and mission work. A happy and peaceful government equals a happy and a peaceful church and
therefore, the government must be supported. Therefore, evangelicals supported the government
and in return the government supported evangelical churches and their programs. For example,
President Moi allocated several tracts of land to the AIC church and the Africa Brotherhood
Church (ABC) to build churches, schools, and hospitals. Several Pentecostal churches too received
huge sums of money from the President. 53
The NCCK condemned hate speech utterances prevalent during the pre-election campaigns of
1992. Under the leadership of Rev. George Wanjau of PCEA, the NCCK’s task force named and
condemned several politicians known for instigating ethnic violence. 54 Also during the meeting,
the chairman of the NCCK’s Justice, Peace and Reconciliation Commission, Bishop Henry Okullu,
harshly criticized the opposition parties for their failure to unite together for the sake of the Kenyan
people; “Our people are asking,” he said, “What has gone wrong?” “Where shall our true liberators
come from?” “Must we be condemned to walk in the darkness of oppression for yet another
decade?” “Must we move from dictatorship to anarchy?” 55
Since it was clear NCCK was more in tune with the opposition than the KANU government, the
NCCK bore the brunt of Moi’s presidency to the extent that it was almost deregistered. 56 But the
NCCK did not cede its ground. They published a document called A Kairos for Kenya, similar to
what their counterparts in South Africa had published calling for the end of apartheid. 57 With a
Gifford, Christianity and Public Life, 217.
Parsitau, “From Prophetic Voices,” 251. Oluoch, Christian Political Theology, 32.
52
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foreword by John W. de Gruchy, the South African document was signed by 156 individuals
representing 20 denominations and focused on calling the church and state to engage in socialpolitical reforms in South Africa. 58 The Kenyan document focused on conquering one-party
dictatorship. Drawing from the South African experience, the NCCK contended that the
Government of Kenya oppressed the people just like apartheid oppressed the people of South
Africa. The A Kairos for Kenya called for political reforms and the necessity of a “Kenya We
Want” national convention.
During the 1997 national election, the NCCK, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Institute for
Education of Democracy formed an election monitoring group to monitor the elections. The Joint
Election Monitoring group, as it was named, published a report on the elections titled, “Report in
the 1997 General Elections in Kenya.” 59 Jacqueline Klopp asserts that the NCCK was the first ever
church-based organization to “document the nature, dynamics, and human consequences of the
violence.” 60
On Tuesday 27 January 1998, 200 Catholic priests, nuns, and brothers from the Nakuru Diocese,
under the leadership of Bishop Peter Kairu, presented a protest letter to the Rift Valley provincial
commissioner, Mr. Nicholas Mberia, in which they condemned the Government of Kenya for its
complicity in the ethnic strife. 61 The statement from the Catholic Bishops is hereby quoted in part
as follows:
It is against this background, and out of our steadfast love and genuine concern for this
nation that we are compelled to make the following appeals to the president: 1) To fulfil
the pledges that he made to Kenyans as he sought their votes, to unite the country and to
bring lasting peace in his last tenure of office, as his legacy; 2) To put an end to the violence
immediately, because we know that he is able if he so wishes; 3) To dismiss from his
cabinet those well-known ministers who have hitherto uttered inflammatory statements that
have always led to ethnic violence. There must be firm action if he wants to put an end to
impunity and enhance respect for the law; 4) To respect and accept defeat from certain
areas and from certain communities, which did not vote for him in the recently concluded
general election, in the same way that they have accepted the presidential results; 5) To
concretely assure Kenyans that ethnic violence will not spread to other areas as is now
feared; 6) To respect the oath of office that he took barely three weeks ago even if he is not
eligible for re-election in the next general elections. 62
More than condemning the violence, the Church did something to help the victims of the ethnic
strife who numbered about 200,000 people. 63 The Roman Catholic Church put up several camps
for the internally displaced in several parts of the country, including Thessalia in Kericho,
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Kamwaura and Elburgon in Nakuru, and Burnt Forest in Eldoret. 64 Similarly, NCCK sponsored
camps in Eldoret town, Soi, and Turbo, while the Quakers had camps in Chwele and Bungoma. 65
Though the Church united in its condemnation of ethnopolitical conflict in the 90s, it oftentimes
failed to exemplify ethnic cohesion. A few examples illustrate this failure. First, there were reports
of impartiality during the relief efforts offered to victims of ethnic violence. Bishop Ndingi of the
Catholic Diocese of Nakuru allegedly concentrated relief work on the mostly Kikuyu Nakuru
District, while neglecting the predominantly Kalenjin, Kericho District. 66
The second example is the election of bishops. The election of Bishop Stephen Kewasis, a Pokot,
to replace Bishop Alexander Muge, a Nandi, of the CPK Eldoret Diocese, is a good example of a
church election decided on the basis of ethnicity. The Nandi Christians of the Anglican Diocese of
Eldoret rejected the election of Kewasis just because he was not a Nandi, though Kewasis finally
became the bishop through a court verdict. 67 In Kajiado, the Maasai rejected the election of Rev.
Bernard Njoroge, a Kikuyu, from being the first bishop of the newly created Kajiado Diocese,
threatening “that fresh tribal clashes would erupt in Kajiado if Njoroge attempted to discharge his
duties as bishop in the new diocese.” 68 The Maasai Anglican Christians rejected Bishop Njoroge
because “he is a stranger in the diocese.” 69 After two years of resistance, the Maasai Christians
finally got one of their own, Rev. Jeremiah Taama, as the Bishop.
Another example is the creation of several dioceses in the CPK Church. Ethnicity dominated the
creation of Katakwa Diocese in Busia District. For more than five years, the Teso-dominated
Katakwa region fought a dramatic and protracted battle to break away from the Luhya-dominated
Nambale Diocese of Bishop Isaak Namango. Finally, the CPK leadership under Archbishop
Manasses Kuria granted the Teso Christians their own diocese of Katakwa on 1 January 1991
under the leadership of Bishop Eliud Okiring. 70 This ethnicization of ecclesiastical leadership in
the Anglican Church affected its credibility. It also provided precedence for the church for
aggrieved Christians from a particular community to use ethnicity to create a new diocese for
themselves from any of the existing dioceses that currently encompass disparate ethnic
communities within their jurisdiction.
The Anglican bishops also divided along ethnic lines in their support of political leaders. 71
Archbishop Manasses Kuria preferred to support Ford Asili chairman, Kenneth Matiba a fellow
Kikuyu, for the presidency, while Henry Okullu, the bishop of Maseno South openly supported
Ford Kenya’s Oginga Odinga, a fellow Luo. 72 The Rev. Elijah Yego of the Eldoret Diocese, a man
who had earlier opposed the election of Bishop Stephen Kewasis because he was not a Nandi,
supported President Daniel Arap Moi, a fellow Kalenjin. Reverend Yego called all non-Kalenjins
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to vote for Moi “or be prepared for eviction from the district if he loses.” 73 Ironically, Rev. Yego
had earlier on, in March 1992, condemned the government for “not doing enough to quell the
fighting in which the Luo have been the main victims.” 74
The foregone account shows that the Kenyan Church actively engaged in political and social
reforms in the 1990s although it was not completely free of ethnic-based conflict. The next time
period (2001–2008) marked the demise of the prophetic voice of the church in Kenya mainly
because of ethnocentrism.
Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Church in Kenya: A Divided Voice (2001–2008)
Ethnic divisions and conflict within the church in Kenya intensified from 2002 to 2008. The period
began with great hope for the country as it marked the end of President Moi’s twenty–four-year
rule. However, his successor, President Mwai Kibaki, though he campaigned on the platform of
ethnic unity, failed to unify the country. Kibaki’s government continued to polarize the country
along ethnic lines. In the same manner, churches, both mainline, evangelical, and Pentecostals,
during this time, were greatly divided.
The first division occurred during the struggle for constitutional review. For many years the
opposition, civil societies, and the Church had been pushing for a constitutional review. In 2001,
President Moi allowed them some latitude to constitute a forum for constitutional changes. This
caused a massive rift between the major church organizations. On one hand, the Forum for
Restoration of Democracy (FORD) and NCCK wanted a review process that consulted Kenyans
from all sectors, from the civil society to professional bodies to the clergy. On the other hand,
evangelicals and a few opposition members such as Raila Odinga wanted a parliamentary-led
review process. The NCCK under the leadership of the General Secretary, Rev. Mutava Musyimi,
proposed a merger between NCCK and the Parliamentary review team. The group referred to as
“Ufungamano Initiative” (after the Ufungamano House, a church-owned premise that was a venue
for most of the meetings), would lead the constitutional review process. The evangelicals, under
the leadership of Archbishop Samson Gaitho, the Bishop of the African Independent Pentecostal
Church, went to court because they wanted to be included in the team. 75 Archbishop Gaitho
bolstered his point by noting that the NCCK represented “few than 40 bodies” while the
evangelicals comprised of “more than 800 registered denominations.” 76
Reverend Musyimi defended the Ufungamano Initiative arguing that they were not being
partisan. 77 Similarly, Archbishop Gitari responded to the evangelicals describing them as
“probably confused because their theology is faulty.” 78 Gitari argued that evangelicals were aloof
during the campaign for multiparty democracy in the early 90’s, and when Kenyans were
struggling for constitutional review, “they only wanted to support the government, whether it was
right or wrong.” 79 He also added, “They kept away from us and even held rallies against
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Ufungamano, now that the war is almost won, it’s not sincere of them to appear at the eleventh
hour with all manner of conditions.” 80
This rift between churches did not go unnoticed. In an editorial cartoon in the Daily Nation of 7
May 2001, the cartoonist drew two goats dressed in the manner likely to suggest that they were
prelates, complete with a miter. Chained to each other but pulling in different directions, each
endeavoring to reach a pot of water labeled constitutional reforms, albeit the pot being out of reach.
This derision of the church highlighted the zero-sum game of each camp’s attempts to block each
other from working towards constitutional reform. The constitutional reforms did not continue
until after the election of December 2002.
After the election, the Kibaki Presidency constituted the Kenya Review Act Chapter 3A, which
established the Kenya Review Commission under the chairmanship of Professor Yash Pal Ghai,
and mandated it to carry on the constitutional review process. The Commission held their meetings
at the Bomas of Kenya in Nairobi from 2002 to 2005 producing the Draft Constitution (Bomas
Draft), which was debated at the Kenya Constitutional Conference at Bomas and later organized
as the Proposed New Constitution to be voted “Yes” or “No” at a national referendum in 2005.
During the campaigns for the referendum, the Church divided along ethnic, denominational, and
party lines. For instance, a group of Catholic bishops from the Central Province under the
leadership of Cardinal John Njue, also from the Central province (Embu), defended President
Kibaki’s presidency arguably because he was Catholic and from the Central province. 81 Their
support came at a time when Kibaki was facing resistance from the opposition because of his
rejection of majimbo (regionalism). Thus Cardinal Njue’s rejection of majimbo, though he claimed
to be informed by national cohesion, was interpreted as support for Kibaki. 82 Accordingly, Njue
was accused of being a “central Kenya mouthpiece” and a “Kibaki sympathizer.” 83 Another
Catholic Bishop, Archbishop Zacchaeus Okoth of Kisumu, distanced himself from Cardinal Njue’s
position by openly supporting the opposition. Here too, Kenyans saw ethnicity as informing
Okoth’s view because he was from Nyanza, and him being a Luo, the community of the opposition
leader, Raila Odinga.
As to the matter of the Bomas Draft constitution, Cardinal Njue encouraged Kenyan Catholics to
vote “with their conscience.” 84 The other denominations, except ACK who also encouraged their
members to “vote with their conscience,” were openly campaigning against it because it permitted
abortion under certain circumstances and it favored Islam by recognizing the formation of Kadhi
courts operated through tax payer’s money. Njue’s word had great authority not only because he
was the one in charge of the Catholic Church at the time but also because he was a Constitution of
Kenya Review Commission national delegate at the Bomas of Kenya representing the Catholic
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Church. Kenyans voted to reject the Bomas Draft constitution on 21 November 2005. 85 It can be
argued that Njue’s recommendations to the Catholics played a part in this defeat. On this note,
Chacha avows, “the defeat of the new constitution was overwhelmingly not only along ethnic lines
but religious too, undoubtedly on the side of Kibaki, who was continually viewed by the Catholics
as a prominent member.” 86
Similarly, the government and the opposition coopted some clergy to their sides. President Kibaki
appointed Rev. Mutava Musyimi, the NCCK undersecretary and hitherto a tough critic of the Moi
regime, as the head of the Steering Committee on Anticorruption (he went on to contest a
parliamentary seat on the president’s party soon after resigning from NCCK and he won). Gifford
observes that “the NCCK under Musyimi changed its stance from ‘principled opposition’ during
the Moi administration to ‘principled cooperation’ towards Kibaki’s.” 87 Raila Odinga of the newly
formed Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), brought in Bishop Margaret Wanjiru, a prominent
televangelist with a larger followership, to most of his political rallies. Wanjiru later vied for a
parliamentary seat on the ODM party and won. Several clergies also sought elective positions in
government but the majority of them lost. Thus the church failed because of the co-option and the
compromise of the clergy by the government and the opposition. 88
The year 2006 and 2007 also intensified partisanship in the Church to a point where “Caesar and
God spoon-fed each other” as Chacha observes. 89 The Church divided along tribal and party lines.
The Church’s lack of voice and clear ethnic division disappointed the Kenyan people. Frequent
newspaper columns and letters to the editor written during this time clearly show the
disappointment. Editorials appeared with titles such as, “The church is not our voice anymore;” 90
“No longer the beacon of morality;” 91 “Heal yourself first, dear clerics;” 92 “Kenya badly in need
of new leaders;” 93 “House of God divided;” 94 “When the shepherds led their flock astray;” 95 “How
clergy took battle to Grim Reaper;” 96 “Church embedded long before elections;” 97 “Ethnicity in
the church comes of age;” 98 “Church’s worrying slide to silence;” 99 “political bishops betraying
the people;” 100 “Kenyan ‘prophets’ who won no respect;” 101 “Did church leaders fail Kenyans?” 102
A banana was the symbol for “Yes” and an orange, a symbol for “No.” When Kenyans voted NO against the Draft
Constitution, their decision inspired the formation of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) under the
leadership of Raila Odinga. Later on, the ODM campaigned vigorously against the Party of National Unity (PNU),
leading to a much-contested election in 2007 and the subsequent violence.
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One author commented that church leaders used their pulpits “to beat drums of ethnic hatred, which
fueled the post-election chaos.” 103 And another writer said, “They preached poison from the
pulpits, these men and women of God! They asked their communities to arm themselves and attack
their fellow Kenyans. Yes, the clergy set community against community and brother against
brother.” 104
In the wake of 2007/2008 post-election chaos, the clergy tried to urge people to embrace peace,
but they were ignored. In fact, more than ten churches nationwide were burnt down. 105 The burning
of thirty-five women and children who had sought shelter in an Assemblies of God church in
Eldoret embodied the force of this national acrimony against the Church. By being partisan, the
Church had lost its prophetic voice and could not be trusted to provide moral and spiritual
direction.
Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Church in Kenya: On the Road to Recovery? (2008–2013)
Soon after the 2007 General Election, the Church discovered that it had lost its prophetic stand and
had no authority to offer moral and spiritual guidance to the people of Kenya. The recovery of
their prophetic place began with a formal apology from the NCCK entitled, “Hope for Kenya” on
15 February 2008. The NCCK apology is hereby quoted in part:
We regret that we as church leaders were unable to effectively confront these issues
because we were partisan. Our efforts to forestall the current crisis were not effective
because we as the membership of NCCK did not speak with one voice. We were divided
in the way we saw the management of the elections; we identified with our people based
on ethnicity; and after the elections, we are divided on how to deal with the crisis. As a
result, we together with other church leaders have displayed partisan values in situations
that called for national interests. The church has remained disunited and its voice
swallowed in the cacophony of those of other vested interests. We call on church leaders
to recapture their strategic position as the moral authority of the nation. We have put in
place measures to enable us overcome the divisive forces, and set off on a new beginning.
As the church, we will do our best in helping achieve the rebirth of a new Kenya. 106
Another apology from the NCCK came in August 2008 at the NCCK General Assembly at
Kabarak University, a meeting where more than 1,300 clergies attended. Reverend Canon Peter
Karanja convened the meeting to give the clerics “a chance to reflect, repent, pray together and be
transformed in the power of the Holy Spirit to become agents of healing and reconciliation to the
nation.” 107 During the meeting, the “Clergymen admitted to blessing warriors to engage in violence
and inviting politicians to disseminate hate messages that incited people against members of
various communities.” 108 The confession was in line with the theme of the meeting, which was
“the truth shall set you free.”
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The Catholic bishops became the second religious group to confess. Their public confession came
in March 2008. Cardinal Njue offered a formal apology at the Holy Family Basilica in Nairobi at
a thanksgiving service offered for the establishment of a grand coalition government. Cardinal
Njue said, “We (the Catholic Church) did not listen to the voice of the shepherd, who is Jesus
Christ. We failed to love one another. We sinned by failing to love one another.” 109 Similarly, at a
meeting to welcome the Pope’s representative in Kenya, Archbishop Alain Paul Lebeaupin,
Cardinal Njue confessed, “We may have taken sides, we may have gone wrong, but we have to
turn around now. Let us embrace the idea of a coalition government because it is through it that
we can ensure the government does not serve the interests of a single individual or community.” 110
Several other churches and organizations joined the NCCK and the Catholic bishops in apologizing
to the country and calling for national healing. For instance, during a prayer meeting for the
Sachang’wan fire tragedy victims in which more than 111 people lost their lives, religious leaders
sought forgiveness for “leaving the people of Kenya dispersed like lost sheep without a shepherd”
during the 2007 General Election. 111 Similarly, the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya was
instrumental in the formation of a lobby group to mediate national cohesion and healing following
the post-election chaos. The group met three times with the former U. N. Secretary General Kofi
Anan in their attempt to broker a national accord. 112
After the post-election chaos, the new Grand Coalition government appointed a commission of
experts to draft a new constitution. When the Members of Parliament could not get the required
signatures to amend the 150 contentious clauses, the proposed constitution was passed as it was.
The Attorney General presented it to be voted either YES or NO at a referendum on 4 August
2010. The Church at this time united with ODM party to campaign against it. The issue of Kadhi
courts and abortion triggered the Church’s rejection of the proposed constitution. All the church
bodies (NCCK, EAK, and KCEC) urged their member churches to reject it. On 30 July 2010 the
Christian leaders issued a joint statement urging their members “to exercise their democratic right
to vote, and to display their patriotism for our country and convincingly vote NO to this flawed
proposed constitution.” 113 Again, on 31 July 2010, the Kenya Episcopal conference issued a
statement signed by all the twenty-five Roman Catholic bishops to reject the proposed constitution
because it permitted abortion. 114
However, not all leaders supported the “NO” campaign. Retired Archbishop Gitari urged the
Anglican Christians to vote “Yes” because the proposed constitution was by far better than the
Lancaster House constitution that Kenya had used since independence. 115 Gitari gained the support
of Bishop Peter Njoka, the Anglican Bishop of Nairobi and Bishop Lawi Imathiu of the Methodist
church. At the end of the campaign, the “Yes” camp won. Kenya promulgated a new constitution
on 27 August 2010. Even though the “No” team was defeated, the unity of the Church was clearly
manifest during this time. For the first time in several years, the Church rose above ethnic divides.
Indeed, the Church could be said to be “on the road to recovery.” Even the Kenyan bishops who
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had no moral ground to talk to Kenyans regained respect in national issues. For instance, the Kenya
Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a pastoral letter urging Kenyans to “to embrace peace and
co-existence.” 116 Maseno West Anglican bishop urged Kenyans to “stand up and say no to the
culture of negative ethnicity, land grabbing, hate speech, and impunity because the country cannot
continue to live in the past.” 117
Conclusion
This chapter argued that the Church in Kenya commanded great influence in the 90s but lost its
prophetic voice in the years 2002 to 2008 mainly because of ethnocentrism and the co-option and
compromise of the clergy by the government and the opposition. Mainline Protestant churches,
especially the CPK and PCEA, under the auspices of the NCCK, called for justice, democracy,
and ethnopolitical cohesion. Similarly, the Roman Catholic Church actively engaged in the sociopolitical transformation of Kenya. However, evangelical churches under the umbrella organization
the EFK (now EAK), steered away from social-political engagement. After the post-election
skirmishes, which followed this period and the church’s subsequent apologies to the Kenyan
people, the church may be said to be on the road to recovery.
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